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Jason Roach 
 
Abstract 
Current research on police psychology in criminal investigations assumes investigative 
decision-making in cold case (undetected) homicides to be the same as that of 
live/current homicide investigations, therefore not warranting exploration in its own 
right. In contrast, the present article suggests that significantly different psychological 
and contextual factors exist which can facilitate bias in investigator decision-making in 
cold case (undetected) homicides. These include the biasing effect of inheriting a chain 
of decisions often made by many previous investigators and the negative framing effect 
that the term ‘cold case’ can have on investigator confidence and on their subsequent 
investigative decision-making. Although the idea that cold case homicide investigation 
necessitates a different ‘investigative mindset’ to live cases is only suggested here, a 
possible agenda for a bespoke research project on cold case investigator decision-
making is tentatively suggested. 
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Introduction 
For one reason or another some crimes appear unsolvable, for example a stranger on 
stranger murder without witnesses, CCTV data, or any forensic evidence. Mercifully, 
most are not. The aim of this article is not to question the balance of priority which 
police might give to more recent crimes over historic unsolved ones, but to suggest that 
police investigators need to be made aware of several important psychological 
differences between live and cold case homicides that can have a negative influence on 
the investigative decisions that they make. Based on reading homicide case files and 
 
 
from anecdotal conversations with police investigators, several examples of cognitive 
bias more likely to influence the investigator of a cold case homicide have emerged, 
culminating in the conclusion that undetected ‘cold’ case homicides often necessitate a 
slightly different ‘investigative mindset’ to the one propagated by the Murder 
Investigation Manual (ACPO/Centrex, 2006) developed for use in ‘live’ (or current) 
homicide investigations (Atkin and Roach, 2015). It is posited in this article that the 
term ‘cold case’ itself, can have a negative influence on investigator confidence with a 
subsequent negative effect on how a cold case homicide investigation is approached and 
conducted. This article begins with a short foray into the literature on investigative 
decision-making.  
 
Investigative decision-making   
Criminal investigators are human beings. As such their investigative decision-making 
relies on the same cognitive systems and processes as the decision-making in other 
(non-forensic) contexts, honed and selected as useful over evolutionary time scales 
(Roach and Pease, 2013b). It suffices to say here that psychologists have identified two 
broad decision-making processes (although admittedly considered an over-simplistic 
model by some). The first, System 1, operates quickly, automatically, effortlessly, 
associatively and is often emotionally charged (Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 
2003; 2011) and represents what many of us would consider to be ‘intuition’ or ‘habit’. 
By contrast, System 2 processing is slower, more effortful, controlled, serial, and is 
relatively flexible and potentially subject to rules (Kahneman, 2003; 2011). System 2 
processing represents what many of us would consider to be ‘rational thought’ or our 
ability to think more deeply about things and consider our actions before we act, 
although the fact is that many of the decisions we make during the course of a day will 
rely mainly on system 1 thinking (i.e. decisions are intuitive and do not consciously 
employ formal types of reasoning). This has important implications for understanding 
investigator decision-making and has been widely researched in relation to live but not 
cold case investigations.  
 
One of the defining properties of System 1, intuitive thought, is that it comes 
automatically and relies on ‘accessibility’ (Tory Higgins, 1996). Accessibility for example 
can be the mention of a familiar object (such as tree) or social category (such as 
 
 
‘traveller’) and a wealth of associated information related to the category stereo-type 
comes to mind. The writer is reminded of an occasion when, on asking several officers 
with over twenty years’ police service, ‘who commits most of the acquisitive crime on 
your patch?’ all three immediately replied, ‘those from the traveller community’. When 
challenged to qualify their answers, the three were found to be from different forces 
(one had Leeds city centre as his patch) and only one admitted that the last couple of 
arrests he had made had been individuals from the traveller community. This is also an 
example of what is termed the ‘representativeness heuristic’ identified by cognitive 
psychologists and behavioural economists, whereby information of little or partial 
relevance is used as a basis for making decisions (e.g. Bar-Hillel, 1982; Kahneman and 
Tversky,1982; Rossmo, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Roach and Pease, 2013a). In this case a 
small number of traveller criminals are considered representative of the whole traveller 
community.  On reflection, all three agreed that perhaps their reply had been greatly 
influenced by recent events and was perhaps subject to exaggeration. Psychologists 
refer to this type of system 1 thinking as schema theory, whereby for example the 
mention of the word ‘tree’, brings to mind associated information (schema) such as 
‘branch’, ‘acorns’, ‘conkers’, ‘leaves’ and ‘huggers’.  
 
The train of thought being followed is that when a homicide case is labelled ‘cold’, it can 
immediately trigger a specific schema or stream of associated information in an 
investigator’s System 1 thinking, which is likely to have a negative influence on how 
he/she perceives (1) the importance of a case and (2) whether they feel they are likely 
to make any progress, having in turn a negative impact on their conducting of the 
subsequent investigation. My point being that although investigators may be more 
vulnerable to certain types of cognitive bias in cold cases than in live/current homicide 
investigations, this is not explored in the research literature or acknowledged in police 
practice manuals.  
 
In the UK , the concept of the detective as a specialist role requiring specific knowledge, 
skills, experience and resources (Atkin and Roach, 2015) has evolved over time as part 
of a wider move away from the traditional view of the ‘omnicompetent’ police officer 
(Stelfox, 2008). Although homicide investigation is generally seen to require different 
skill and knowledge sets to those of more mainstream policing, an omnicompetent view 
 
 
of the detective is still visible by the fact that the same officers investigate all types of 
homicide suggesting the continued assumption of the 'omincompetent homicide 
detective' (Atkin and Roach, 2015). This article explores this by asking the question: are 
live and cold homicide investigations the same thing? We begin with an important 
influencer of investigator decision-making, the official guidance available to UK 
investigators.  
 
Investigative guidance in UK policing 
With regard to the conduct of criminal investigations, police in England and Wales are 
guided generically by The Core Investigative Doctrine (CID) and Major Incident Room 
Standard Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP).1 These are generic guidance in that they 
can be applied to a host of different types of criminal investigation, unlike for example 
the Murder Investigation Manual (MIM), which is specific to homicides. It is not my 
intention to criticise the MIM, indeed there is much to commend in trying to make 
criminal investigative practice and procedures for homicide more systematic and 
consistent and in providing valuable support to neophyte investigators. Such 
publications must not be overly-prescriptive as homicide is committed in a wide array 
of different contexts and scenarios, for example a gangland killing or the killing of a 
child by its step-parent, and a certain amount of investigator discretion will always be 
required. Moreover, as murders do not occur in the same circumstances and contexts, 
even if a definitive guide to investigating all murders was desired it would be 
unachievable. Instead the guide provides an outline of the necessary procedural 
requirements and processes (including evidential standards) for those conducting 
criminal investigations to consult and follow. Such guidance also provides a suitable 
benchmark by which individual investigations can be judged or reviewed, particularly 
those considered not to have reached a satisfactory conclusion (i.e. the identification 
and successful prosecution of a suspect). 
 
A conclusion can be drawn therefore that in policing circles generally, no significant 
differences exist between the investigation of live/current and cold case homicides, 
evidenced by the fact that the guidance available (e.g. the MIM) does not itself 
differentiate between the two (Atkin and Roach, 2015). Put simply, there is no 
additional guidance or information for investigators of cold case homicides to draw 
 
 
upon in the MIM, as the same ‘investigative mindset’ is advocated for both types of 
investigation, and with no mention made of the potentially different biasing effects on 
investigators.      
 
Cognitive bias and criminal investigation 
The success of a criminal investigation (i.e. where a suspect is successfully identified, 
charged and convicted) largely depends on the correct decision-making of the 
investigator (Fahsing and Ask, 2013). We do not, however, inhabit a world which 
always facilitates such correct or optimal decision-making (see Kahneman, 2011). 
Optimal decision-making is often influenced by the pressures of the job, such as limited 
time and the competition for resources. Perhaps unsurprisingly, investigator objectivity 
has consistently been shown often to be debilitated (Ask and Granhag, 2007; Fahsing 
and Ask, 2013) and has led to numerous examples of miscarriages of justice (see 
Rossmo, 2009 for a fuller discussion).  
 
Gollwitzer (1990) suggests that much human decision-making and consequently 
behaviour is ‘goal directed’. That is, we humans make decisions with specific goals in 
mind and there is little doubt that criminal investigators are any less human in this 
respect. Building on Gollwitzer and colleagues’ early work (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen and 
Steller, 1990), Fahsing and Ask (2013) tested the cognitive performance of criminal 
investigators’ decision-making across different stages of goal-directed behaviour. They 
found that when investigators were in the ‘deliberative mindset’ they were more open-
minded and generated a greater number of hypotheses (for example about what might 
have happened and why) than when they adopted a more closed and narrow 
‘implemental mindset’.  
 
Although the research literature on investigative decision making in homicide 
investigations is replete with examples of how different types of cognitive bias, such as 
'tunnel vision' (Rossmo, 2009: McLean and Roach, 2011), confirmation bias (Rossmo, 
2009; Roach and Pease, 2013) and the 'representativeness heuristic' (Rossmo, 2009; 
McLean and Roach, 2011; Roach and Pease, 2013a) can and do negatively influence 
criminal investigations, it remains assumed by police and academics alike that:  
 
 
(i) the same types of investigative decision are made irrespective of 
whether an investigation is live, historic or cold and then; 
(ii) exactly the same types and contexts for cognitive bias exist that pose 
the same risks to both live and cold homicide investigations.  
Research on cold case investigation is sparse when compared with that of live homicide 
investigation (Atkin and Roach, 2015). As Allsop (2012) states, the little that does exist 
tends to fall into two genres: practical resources for investigators (such as Silvia 
Pettem’s 2013 book Cold Case Research: Resources for Unidentified, Missing, and Cold 
Homicide Cases) or ‘true murders for an interested public’ (p. 179). To the writer’s 
knowledge, there has to date been no systematic study of investigative decision-making 
in cold case investigations and the different effects of cognitive bias on cold case 
investigators. By focusing on the as yet neglected area of decision making in cold case 
investigations, this article calls for research to question the assumption that cold and 
live investigations simply require the same thinking and so are vulnerable to the same 
cognitive bias. 
 
A first question when looking at cognitive bias in cold case investigation is whether such 
cases are more likely to encourage an implemental rather than deliberative mindset. In 
this article the answer posited is yes. Next, follow some suggestions for how and why 
this is likely to be more the case for investigative thinking and decision-making in cold 
cases, compared with that of live homicide investigation. We begin with the common 
perceptions of the prefixes ‘live’, ‘historic’, and ‘cold’, when placed in front of ‘homicide’.  
 
Live, historic and cold homicide investigation. Substantively or semantically 
different? 
A logical place to start is with what live, historic and cold homicide cases are believed to 
mean, although these are not of course mutually exclusive or invariant over time. In fact, 
this is part of the argument: if investigators want to place a homicide into one of these 
three categories and keep it there, this will influence the mindset employed. However, 
when commonly categorised, a live homicide (although seeming an oxymoron on first 
hearing) unsurprisingly refers to a current or recent case being investigated, whereby 
cold refers (arguably unsympathetically) to those cases where the investigation has not 
yielded a satisfactory conclusion (i.e. the killer has not been prosecuted or more 
 
 
commonly is yet to be identified). Although these often appear as two discrete 
categories created for investigative purposes, one must not forget that all cold 
homicides begin as live cases and some cold cases become live again, for example if a 
new witness comes forward or new forensic evidence comes to light. Use of the term 
historic homicides remains less defined, but generally is taken to be those cases where 
suspects are identified after a significant period of time - for example, in the case of 
Peter Tobin, where the gardens of his previous homes were searched for further victims 
after he was identified as a serial murderer. More recently the term ‘historic crime’ has 
become perhaps more synonymous with past ‘child sexual exploitation’ (CSE) in the 
minds of the British public, probably as a consequence of the high number of ‘historic’ 
investigations stretching back to the 1970s, which often involve prominent media 
celebrities of the time such as Operation Yew Tree incorporating many of the numerous 
Savile enquiries.  
 
Deciding whether a homicide is live, historic or cold when understanding investigator 
decision-making is more than semantics. It is important because it is likely to affect the 
investigator’s initial level of confidence with regard to achieving a satisfactory 
investigative outcome. Figure 1 shows the logical flow of investigator confidence across 
all three different categories of homicide investigation. 
 
Figure 1. Investigator confidence in different types of homicide investigation 
 
Let us hypothesise that all investigators begin live homicide investigations with the 
belief that they will get a ‘result’, so investigator confidence in all live investigations 
should be highest initially. Given the live homicide clearance rate (usually around 92% 
in the UK), this confidence is well founded. For those beginning an investigation of 
historic homicide, although initial confidence is unlikely to be high, if investigating 
allegations against a likely suspect it should be reasonably high as there is a prime 
High • Live homicide investigations
Medium • Historic homicide investigations
Low • Cold case homicide investigations 
 
 
suspect to investigate. As Davis et al. (2014:375) point out, in the USA, although there is 
no 'universally accepted metric for when a case becomes cold', one year is seen by many 
to be the boundary between live and cold cases of homicide. In the UK, Innes and Clarke 
(2009) suggest that a case becomes cold when all viable leads have become exhausted.  
However a case may be defined ‘cold’ the fact that it is referred to as such is likely to 
have an immediate effect on those charged with investigating it. By definition, a cold 
case is likely to be considered the most difficult type of investigation to solve, with many 
investigators likely to have tried in the past but to no avail. Here somewhat 
unsurprisingly, it stands to reason that investigator confidence of success is likely to be 
much lower than for ‘live’ and ‘historic’ cases. This is reflected perhaps in the fact that 
solvability issues appear to be more important in determining the degree of resources 
given to a cold case investigation, with those promising more forensic leads prioritised 
over those cold cases with little or none (Atkin and Roach, 2015; Allsop, 2013). 
The most immediate (but not exhaustive) investigative differences between live and 
cold homicide cases are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Investigative differences in live and cold homicide investigations. 
Live cases Cold cases 
Fresh Previously investigated (possibly many 
times) 
Real time Long interval in time since the crime 
High optimism Low optimism 
Greater chance of reliable witnesses Less chance of reliable witnesses 
Good chance of forensic evidence Less  chance of more forensic evidence 
Control over gathering and storing of 
evidence 
Little control over storing of past 
evidence  
Greater utility of public appeals Little utility in public appeals 
Pressure is immediate Pressure is less but constant 
Offender likely to be alive Fair chance offender is deceased 
 
Table 1 suggests the level of investigator control in live homicides to be much greater 
than for cold cases, primarily because it appears, at face value at least, that the cold case 
investigator has little more to work with beyond that provided by previous 
 
 
investigators. Turning back the clock and beginning the investigation afresh is not an 
option, so the cold case investigator’s lot may not seem a happy one, with the likelihood 
of a successful detection looking slim.  
 
Framing is the passive acceptance of the formulation given (Kahneman, 2003). The 
frame for cold case homicides suggests that by definition these are difficult if not 
impossible cases to solve, barring for example a recent breakthrough in forensic 
evidence. If this has not occurred, then the psychological effect on an officer or officers 
charged with investigating a cold case is likely to evoke pessimism and far more 
negativity than that for live and historic investigations. Put simply, the psychological 
frame for cold cases appears to be one of narrow investigative control with the 
investigative direction contingent on decisions made in previous investigations. 
A related issue is whether investigators are likely to be equally pessimistic about all 
cold case homicides that they are asked to investigate and whether this has the same 
effect on investigators at the initial point of allocation irrespective of the cold case. An 
investigator assigned to a cold case homicide may not perceive it (or even approach it) 
in the same way if it involves a previous gross miscarriage of justice, as in the murder of 
Lesley Molseed, where the innocent, Stefan Kiszko, was imprisoned for sixteen years 
until eventually being exonerated in 1992 (Roach and Pease, 2009) as where a case 
does not involve miscarriage of justice. Similarly an investigator with little success in 
cold case investigations to date is more likely to be pessimistic about success in the next 
one.   
 
A brief discussion of perceptions of ‘solvability’ and how they can influence investigator 
confidence in cold case homicides is presented next. 
 
Solvability and investigator confidence in cold case homicide investigations 
Dugan et al. (1999) found that although in the 1960s the vast majority of victims of 
homicide knew their killers, by 1992 in the USA this had dropped to 53% making 
homicide cases harder to solve and with a knock-on effect on clear-up rates and 
therefore a rise in the percentage becoming undetected, cold cases. 'Stranger on 
stranger' murders are often the most difficult to detect when a firearm has been used 
(Ousey and Lee, 2009) or where the homicide occurs in a high crime rate area (Borg and 
 
 
Parker, 2001). Roach (2012) in a study of two 'long interval detections' (where the 
homicide was solved decades after the crime by a DNA hit which identified the killer), 
found that detection had been severely hindered as both offenders had moved away 
from the area of the crime soon after the murder.   
 
Davis et al. (2014), from a study of 189 solved and unsolved cases in Washington D.C., 
found that new information from witnesses or information from new witnesses (often 
criminal informants) was cited as the most common reason for case clear up. For cold 
cases specifically; crime context, initial investigation results, the basis for opening a cold 
case, and cold case investigator action, were found to be the factors that best predicted 
whether a case would be solved, and not new forensic evidence.  
 
We turn next to the important influence of the interval of time since a homicide on 
investigator perceptions of solvability. 
 
Cognitive bias, time and the investigation of crime 
Although admittedly only hypothesised here, one likely biasing influence on cold case 
investigators’ decision-making is how confident they are of being able to get a 
satisfactory outcome (e.g. identifying the offender) when there has been a significant 
time interval between the original crime and when an investigator is asked to revive the 
case. The time since a crime has occurred is likely to impact on investigator confidence 
in achieving a successful outcome.  
 
Investigator (and force) confidence in a successful outcome is likely to decrease as time 
passes, with the cold case investigator, for example, likely to be far less confident of 
achieving a satisfactory outcome after a two-year interval since the original crime (i.e. a 
detection) than the investigator of the same crime 6 months after it occurred. This is 
mitigated if there is a major shift in its perceived solvability, when for example a 
significant witness comes forward, the discovery of new forensic evidence (e.g. DNA) or 
the offender confesses. 
 
The effect of time on investigator confidence could be perceived as obvious and 
irrelevant, and as unrelated to investigative decision-making as all homicide 
 
 
investigations must be carried out in the same way irrespective of whether they are live 
or cold. As stated earlier, the purpose of this article is to question this assumption. The 
hypothesis posited is that cold case investigations demand a different investigative 
mindset because they are in many ways very different to live investigations. The effect 
of elapsed time is not the only important influence of potential bias here on investigator 
(and force) confidence in cold case homicide investigations. Box 1 presents a brief 
thought experiment: 
 
 
The thinking hopefully stimulated by Box 1 is that investigator confidence can be easily 
influenced by the inclusion of new information, for example discovering a new witness 
is more likely to increase confidence, whereas realising that some great detectives have 
tried to solve the case in the past is likely to reduce it. Investigator confidence, like the 
mortgage rate, can go up as well as down as the perception of a case changes. How an 
investigator perceives a cold case can be influenced by a host of different variables, such 
Box 1. Framing effects and investigator confidence  
Imagine that you are a police investigator given the cold case homicide of a 
young woman who was killed two years previously. 
1. Based on this information how confident do you think that you would 
be that you were able to solve this case?  
 
2. You quickly discover a new potential witness but no new forensic 
evidence. Now how confident do you think that you would be that you 
were able to solve this case?  
 
3. Upon reading the case files you see that a number of great detectives 
have worked on this case in the past. Now how confident do you think 
that you would be that you were able to solve this case?  
 
4. A number of live homicide cases come in at the same time with which 
you must be involved and you are also told that few resources are 
available to you for this cold case investigation. Now how confident do 
you think you would be that you would be able to solve this case?  
How confident are you that you can progress this investigation in any 
way? 
 
 
as whether the case was previously investigated by a renowned detective, which in turn 
can affect their level of confidence in achieving a successful outcome. Put bluntly, if an 
investigator believes a case to be unsolvable before they have looked at it, then it most 
certainly is. Through this framing, they become a victim of confirmation bias by simply 
confirming investigative decisions made by previous investigators.  
 
Confirmation bias and the cold case homicide review  
Confirmation (or verification) bias is arguably the most researched influencer of 
investigative decision-making, whereby people tend to seek information that supports 
an existing belief over that which refutes or challenges it (Evans 1989; Nickerson, 1998; 
Kahneman, 2011). It leads to selective information searching (see Ask and Granhag, 
2005; Snyder and Swann, 1978; Wason, 1968) where information supporting a 
favoured hypothesis is prioritised over that which does not support it, producing a 
biased interpretation of the available information (e.g. Snyder and Swann, 1978; Wason, 
1968). Here, information available is interpreted in ways that are partial toward 
existing beliefs (Ask and Granhag, 2005). Seen in an investigative context, the effects of 
confirmation bias on investigative decision making is well documented, replete with 
examples of where it has played a major part in gross miscarriages of justice, such as 
that of Stefan Kiszko (Roach and Pease, 2009) mentioned earlier. Confirmation bias has 
led to other similarly disastrous investigative failures, such as that of Peter Sutcliffe, 
known as the Yorkshire Ripper (e.g. Rossmo, 2009: Roach and Pease, 2009). Stelfox and 
Pease (2005) identify confirmation bias to be the common result of adopting an 
implemental mindset, for example when investigators jump prematurely from the 
process of ‘suspect identification’ to ‘suspect verification’ (see Rossmo, 2009, for a very 
good account).  
 
To date, research into the effects of confirmation bias on investigative decision-making 
has only focused on how live investigations are affected and not the probable 
cumulative effect of a succession of investigators working on the same undetected case. 
Confirmation bias can adversely affect investigator decision-making in cold cases in 
relation to the reviewing of cold cases and understanding what is actually meant by the 
term ‘review’ in the first place. Turner (2005:3) defines the investigative review process 
as:  
 
 
A constructive evaluation of the conduct of an investigation to ensure an objective 
and thorough investigation has been conducted to national standards which seeks 
to ensure investigative opportunities are not overlooked and that good practice is 
identified. 
 
That Turner’s (2005) definition captures well the necessity for and function of an 
effective review process in criminal investigation is not disputed here, but rather 
whether current review processes are setup exclusively with live investigations in mind 
and so do not fit well with cold case investigation (Atkin and Roach, 2015). The current 
case review process in England and Wales has several stages: 
1. Management intervention – review within 24 hours to check that nothing has 
been missed and confirm staffing. 
2. 28 day review or progress review – formal review with a full team utilised  
3. Thematic reviews 
4. Closure review 
5. Peer reviews 
6. Cold case reviews 
7. Multi-agency reviews (e.g. serious case reviews; MAPPA). 
8. Hot de-briefs 
                                                                                  (Marshall, 2012:56). 
Taken as a whole the current review process appears to be quite thorough but by the 
time a case is considered cold that thoroughness does not appear to be equally applied, 
with the review of a cold case described thus, ‘If no viable lines of enquiry are left then 
enter ‘investigative maintenance process’ (Fox, 2007:141). 
 
What the ‘maintenance process’ actually consists of is not elaborated on with, for 
example, little guidance given about the methodology to be adopted in live homicide 
cases and none given at all about how to prepare for and review cold cases (Atkin and 
Roach, 2015). Whether reviews of cold cases are actually often proper reviews at all is 
therefore debatable. Whether the frame for cold case review is far too narrow is not. I 
suggest that this point is important to cold case investigations for several reasons. First, 
a review of a cold case generally means a review of all the previous reviews and 
sometimes just the most recent one. If proven to be the case, then any confirmation bias 
 
 
in an initial investigation is likely to remain unrecognised by those ‘reviewing’ the same 
case evidence years later. Second, and perhaps most obvious, is that the reviewing 
officer with no new leads to follow is likely to agree with the decision-making of the 
initial investigator providing the correct procedures have been followed. As was 
previously suggested, nothing is more likely to excite confirmation bias than the 
perception of cold cases as ‘unsolvable’.  
 
Third, as the cold case investigator has to rely on the evidence collected by the initial 
investigator, they will be in danger of succumbing to a biased interpretation of the 
information available to them, particularly if the case is a high-profile, famous one then 
they will have little information with which to refute any hypotheses held by the initial 
investigator. One can merely speculate here on the objectivity in which investigative 
decision-making and evidence is recorded by investigators for future investigators to 
review/use (Atkin and Roach, 2015). Research has consistently shown that we are not 
objective purveyors of our world (Rossmo, 2009) rather we are influenced by our 
experiences and expectations (Heuer, 1999). Moreover, what we remember depends on 
what we believe (Begley, 2005) and the cold case investigator that remembers a case 
from the media coverage years before is unlikely to be as objective as the one with no 
prior knowledge of the case – erroneous or otherwise.  
 
Cognitive bias can affect investigators of cold case homicides in a number of different 
ways to live homicide investigations. One other example of how such bias can have an 
effect on cold case investigators is how they justify working on (or not working on) a 
cold case in the first place. Allsop (2013:373) presents some interesting research on the 
‘motivational vocabularies’ used by cold case investigators which she distils down to: 
(1) Because we can 
(2) Because victims and families deserve it. 
(3) Because justice deserves it. 
(4) As a preventative measure. 
The obvious question to be explored is the influence of cognitive bias and other 
variables on whether an investigator will use one of Allsop’s motivational vocabularies 
to justify the resources necessary to conduct a cold case investigation or not, although 
this is beyond the scope of this article.  
 
 
This article aims to inspire research in the area of investigative decision-making in cold 
cases, or at least to provoke some thinking about it. To this end, it concludes with a brief 
and tentative agenda for further research. 
 
Cognitive bias and the cold case investigation: A tentative research agenda 
To re-state the central argument: the cognitive influencers on investigative decision-
making are arguably different in form and intensity in live and cold case homicide 
investigations and warrant empirical testing and exploration. They are not the same and 
so do not require exactly the same thinking and approach. The following represents a 
tentative research agenda: 
1. Research that focuses on the different priming effects that different types of 
homicide investigation can have on investigators because the words ‘live’ 
(current), ‘historic’, and ‘cold case’ are more than likely to prime investigators 
into certain ways of thinking (i.e. framing). What is needed is research which 
identifies this framing effect by which a sample of investigators are asked 
questions relating to their initial thoughts when tasked with ‘live’, ‘historic’ and a 
‘cold case’ homicide scenarios. The level and frequency of which system of 
thinking is employed needs to be understood. 
2. Research to identify the variables which affect investigator confidence most in 
cold case investigations in order to generate a better understanding of how 
decisions are made and influenced in cold case homicide investigations. 
3. Research which focuses on what is actually meant by a ‘review’ in cold cases, 
such as what a review usually entails and the common features necessary to 
trigger a full ‘root and branch’ review. 
4. Research to identify whether a difference exists in the way that investigators 
think about and approach cold cases that are simply undetected compared with 
those which previously led to a miscarriage of justice. One presumes the latter 
will be more likely to be reviewed in the fullest sense of the word. 
5. Cold case reviews are normally conducted by teams and not individuals. 
Research is needed that focuses on how group dynamics play a role in 
inadvertently encouraging cognitive bias, for example a team member opining 
that ‘there is no point in trying to solve this case’, is likely to negatively affect the 
 
 
confidence and conviction of the rest of the investigation team, particularly 
where the pessimist is the senior investigating officer. 
6. Research exploring the biasing effect of prior knowledge of a case on cold case 
investigators. Roach and Pease (2009) suggest that the only way to achieve an 
objective approach to a cold case review is to bring in officers with no prior 
knowledge of it at all, either from another force or, even better, from another 
country.  
This agenda is as tentative as it is incomplete. I hope to have warmed the thinking 
around cold case decision-making and moved on the research agenda a little with this 
brief discussion. Please do contact me for further information on these issues. 
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